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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
TRIBAL COURTS: Double Jeopardy
United States v. Weaselhead, 25 Indian L. Rep. 2195 (8th Cir. Sept. 9, 1998)
Robert Lee Weaselhead, Jr., an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe,
pled no contest to one count of first degree sexual assault in Winnebago
Tribal Court.' On the same day Weaselhead pled no contest in tribal court,
he was indicted by a federal grand jury on three counts of having sex with a
minor, Count III of which was the same for which he had been tried in tribal
court. Weaselhead moved to dismiss Count II on double jeopardy grounds
but the motion was denied in district court? A panel of the Eighth Circuit
held that the power of a tribe to try non-member Indians in its court system
was a congressional delegation of power and thus subject to double jeopardy
protections.4 Based on this, the court reversed the order denying Weaselhead's
motion on Count 1l
To reach this decision, the Eighth Circuit panel explored the history of
tribal criminal jurisdiction. Primary authority limiting tribal jurisdiction is
Oliphant.' Since the earliest Europeans arrived here, Indians have been
regarded as inferior in the courts and legislatures of the United States. The
Supreme Court reaffirmed this in Oliphant by making it doctrine that whites
should not be subject to a tribe's criminal jurisdiction.
The Eighth Circuit panel also cited Duro7 in its reasoning. In Duro, the
Supreme Court sought to avert the appearance of racism in Oliphant. The
Court in Duro stated that, when the first whites stepped onto the continent, the
tribes not only lost the power to try whites, but also lost the power to try
Indians who were not members of the tribe asserting jurisdiction.8
Congress, with the Duro decision, finally attempted to halt the Supreme
Court's attack on tribal sovereignty. Congress affirmed a tribe's inherent
sovereign right to criminally try any Indian by amending the Indian Civil
1. United States v. Weaselhead, 25 Indian L. Rep. 2195, 2195 (8th Cir. Sept. 9, 1998).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2198.
5. Id.
6. Oliphant v. Suquanish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
7. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
8. Weaseihead, 25 Indian L. Rep. at 2196-97.
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Rights Act.9 The Eighth Circuit panel held this amendment to be a delegation
of power by Congress thus implicating the Fifth Amendment."
All of these cases create interesting and potentially explosive questions.
Since "the authority to govern is derived from the consent of the governed,""
can the native peoples of North America withdraw their consent to be
governed by the United States and thus return to independence? Does this
series of cases mean that a resident of one state cannot be tried in another
state because that resident has not consented to being governed in the other
state? Finally, does this holding mean that, for example, if a Navajo were to
leave the Navajo Reservation and enter Arizona that Arizona could not
prosecute that Navajo for a criminal offense? The answer to all of these
questions is no. The Supreme Court has made it clear that these rules only
apply when an inferior race attempts to assert jurisdiction over a superior race.
The Oliphant, Duro, and Weaselhead decisions all show that there is
considerable confusion on the topic of tribal criminal jurisdiction. En banc,
the Eighth Circuit split evenly on the subject of double jeopardy and thus the
district court ruling that there was no double jeopardy was affirmed."
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EMPLOYMENT: National Origin Discrimination Based on Tribal Membership
Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power
District, 25 Indian L. Rep. 2200 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 1998).
A pivate employer on the Navajo reservation entered into a lease with the
tribe in 1969." The lease required the employer to give preference to Navajo
tribal members.' The plaintiff, a Hopi, sued the employer claiming that he
had been discriminated against based on national origin as he was denied this
preference."
The Ninth Circuit held that this preference did discriminate against the
plaintiff based on his national origin." Citing numerous cases, the court
stated that precedence indicated that national origin included the origin of
one's ancestors and that the current existence of a nation was not required for
9. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1991, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994).
10. Weaselhead, 25 Indian L. Rep. at 2198.
11. Id. at 2197.
12. United States v. Weaselhead, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999).
13. Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 25 Indian L.
Rep. 22C0, 2200 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 1998).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2203.
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the purpose of defining national origin.'" Based on this, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs case."
It seems that in this era of Indian affairs, many in power have sought ways
to erode tribal sovereignty. Any benefit or advantage that a tribe may have
is subject to attack. With this case, the Ninth Circuit has found a way to chip
away at what little power remains with the Navajo Nation.
This case also opens avenues of attack that no reasonable person would
accept. If an Oklahoman denies employment to a Texan, Texas having been
a sovereign nation, the Texan would have a "national origin" claim. This
would also be true for other citizens of states that were formerly nations such
as California and Hawaii. Finally, this decision opens the door to attack all
Indian preference hiring procedures. Now, a non-Indian denied employment
in an "Indian preference" position can sue based on a national origin vice a
race cause of action. Under the court's reasoning in Dawavendewa, the
plaintiff would prevail. This panel of the Ninth Circuit has set a very
dangerous precedent with its decision.
(Based on a phone call with attorneys for the Navajo Nation, the American
Indian Law Review learned that this case has been appealed for an en banc
hearing before the Ninth Circuit but no information about the status of the
appeal was available as of late January 1999.)
MONTANA DISTRICT COURT
JURISDICTION: Limits on Tribal Civil Jurisdiction
Austin's Express, Inc. v. Arneson, 25 Indian L. Rep. 3187 (D. Mont. Mar. 12,
1998)
On the surface, Arneson is a simple negligence case. However, when
reviewed in light of recent federal court decisions, it is another statement of
the federal judiciary's contempt for Indian courts.
On October 24, 1995, Dallas Dust, a Crow tribal member, was struck and
killed while walking on part of the Interstate 95 right-of-way that traverses the
Crow Reservation. 9 His estate sued in Crow tribal court.' The defendant
moved for summary judgement based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction'
The motion was denied whereupon, the defendant filed a motion in federal
district court seeking a declaration that the tribal court did not have
jurisdiction.' The United States District Court for the District of Montana
17. Id. at 2200-01.
18. Id. at 2203.
19. Austin's Express, Inc. v. Arneson, 25 Indian L. Rep. 3187, 3187 (D. Mont. Mar. 12,
1998).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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granted the motion and permanently enjoined the plaintiffs from proceeding
further in tribal court.
The district court relied on two other cases to reach its decision. In order
to defeat the plaintiffs claim that an injury to a tribal member would give the
tribe jurisdiction as an exception to the Montana rule,' the court cited
Wilson v. Marchington.' In Wilson, a member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe,
was struck by another vehicle while attempting to exit U.S. Highway 2 on the
Blackfeet Indian Reservation.' Wilson won in tribal court and then
registered the judgment in the federal system in the District of Montana. 7
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the tribal court judgment was invalid
and comity was not required.'
The Ninth Circuit in Wilson quoted Justice Ginsberg's dicta from Strate
to reach its conclusion. In Justice Ginsberg's opinion, the possibility of
reckless drivers injuring tribal members was not significant enough to trigger
the Montana exception regarding something that would "imperil the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the Tribe."'3
Strate was also cited by the district court in Austin's Express in order to
hold that the highway was not Indian country. In Strate,3' the Supreme
Court, in a decision that is obviously erroneous, completely ignored the statute
defining Indian country32 which the Court itself frequently cites. Even though
the statute clearly states that Indian country includes rights-of-way, the Court
ignored this to find a way to limit tribal jurisdiction. The land under the right-
of-way was still held in trust for the tribe 3 but the Court, arbitrarily, likened
it to alienated fee land.34
Relying on Strate, the district court held that the right-of-way was not
Indian country.35 With both of the plaintiffs contentions defeated, the district
court granted Austin's Express' motion for summary judgment.'
Tribal courts have been looked down upon as a lesser judicial entity by
most non-Indian judiciaries. The Anglo courts of the land are content to let
the tribes handle petty actions in civil and criminal cases. However, the courts
23. Id. at 3189.
24. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
25. 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
26. Id. at 807.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 815.
29. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
30. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 815.
31. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
33. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1413.
34. Id.
35. Austin's Express, Inc. v. Arneson, 25 Indian L. Rep. 3187, 3188 (D. Mont. Mar. 12,
1998).
36. Id. at 3189.
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draw the line when an important matter arises or when whites may be hailed
into the courts of red men. From Oliphant" through Strate," the Supreme
Court has taken every opportunity to limit, if not destroy, tribal court
jurisdiction over whites. Until the tribes are recognized as truly sovereign
nations and accorded the corresponding authority and respect, their court
systems will always be considered second-rate.
37. Oliphant v. Suquarnish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
38. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
No. 2]
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